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IV. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION*
A. Introduction
"[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction."' As such, a
litigant who wants to be in the federal forum must take precautions
and consider whether all her claims can be heard in the forum. In a
perfect world, litigation would be simple, consisting of lawsuits
containing one claim asserted by one plaintiff against one defendant.
In reality, actions often consist of multiple claims and multiple
parties, some of which arise during the course of litigation.
Furthermore, in order for each of these claims to remain in the
federal forum, each must have a basis of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Generally, there are two ways that a federal court may exercise
jurisdiction over claims: (1) original jurisdiction and (2)
supplemental jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. section 1367.
Original jurisdiction deals with claims that have independent bases
of jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction allows for additional
claims lacking an independent basis of jurisdiction to be heard by the
federal court as long as they are so related as to form part of the same
case or controversy as a claim that has an independent basis of
jurisdiction.2 This concept of allowing supplemental claims into the
federal forum "preserve[s] for litigants the attractiveness of the
federal forum by allowing the entire case to be tried in federal
court."3  Thus, this Part examines developments in the area of
supplemental jurisdiction that would be of interest both to a litigant
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B.A. English and Organizational Studies, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor.
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1. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
3. Patrick D. Murphy, A Federal Practitioner's Guide to Supplemental
Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 973, 976 (1995).
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who wants to be in federal court, and to a litigant who wants to avoid
this forum.
Supplemental jurisdiction grew up as judge-made doctrine, but
was later codified in section 1367 in 1990. Since the codification of
this doctrine, there has been confusion as to the meaning and content
of supplemental jurisdiction.4 This confusion is still apparent
fourteen years later. 5 It is important for a litigant who wants to attain
or evade the federal forum to understand the different issues that may
arise in choosing a forum as a result of supplemental jurisdiction.
Supplemental jurisdiction can serve either as a bridge or a barrier to
the federal forum; an understanding of this area can give a forum-
shopping litigant an advantage by helping the litigant secure or avoid
a forum.
B. Section 1367(a)-The Open Door
Section 1367 appears to be a broad grant of jurisdiction,
allowing courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims that are "so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution."6 This Part examines how broad this
subsection is and looks at supplemental jurisdiction born out
of section 1367 as compared to the doctrines it emerged from:
ancillary, pendent and pendent party jurisdiction.
Supplemental jurisdiction as it exists today, under section 1367,
is the descendant of the judge-made law of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction. On December 1, 1990, the Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990, containing the supplemental jurisdiction statute, was signed
into law.7 Section 1367 introduced a new terminology to older
4. See generally Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental
Jurisdiction Statute-A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 849 (1992) (criticizing § 1367's codification and expansion of
"supplemental jurisdiction").
5. See Georgene M. Vairo, Problems in Federal Forum Selection and
Concurrent Federal State Jurisdiction: Supplemental Jurisdiction; Diversity
Jurisdiction; Removal; Preemption; Venue; Transfer of Venue; Personal
Jurisdiction; Abstention and the All Writs Act, in 1 ALI-ABA COURSE STUDY
MATERIALS: CIVIL PRACTICE AND TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL AND STATE
COURTS 221, 264 (2003), WL SH063 ALI-ABA 221, at *264.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
7. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). For a detailed discussion
of the history of the statute's enactment, see McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 852-
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principles; pendent, pendent party, and ancillary jurisdiction were
now all a part of supplemental jurisdiction. As a result of the fact
that supplemental jurisdiction was born of long-standing principles
of judge-made law, a great deal of confusion and criticism ensued
regarding the meaning of the statute.8 Thus, an understanding of the
law as it stands today requires an understanding of the origins of the
doctrine and the ways in which it has changed.9
1. Pendent jurisdiction
Pendent jurisdiction dealt with whether the federal court could
exercise jurisdiction over a non-federal claim in an action where the
original jurisdiction of the court was based on federal question
jurisdiction.' 0 The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction derives from
court-created doctrine," which was ultimately clarified and set forth
in the pivotal case of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs. 2 As the
Supreme Court articulated in Gibbs, pendent jurisdiction "exists
whenever there is a claim [with an independent basis of jurisdiction]
and the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits
the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but
one constitutional 'case." ' 13 In defining what this standard entailed,
the Court found that "[t]he state and federal claims must derive from
a common nucleus of operative fact... such that [a plaintiff] would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding,
then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in
federal courts to hear the whole."'14 Thus, the crux for the test of
58 and John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal
Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24
U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 735, 736-37 (1991).
8. See generally McLaughlin, supra note 4 (criticizing the supplemental
jurisdiction statute).
9. For a detailed discussion of the judge-made doctrines of ancillary,
pendent, and pendent party jurisdiction, see Murphy, supra note 3, at 975-91.
10. See David D. Siegel, Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice
Under the New (Dec. 1, 1990) Judicial Improvements Act, 133 F.R.D. 61, 63
(1991).
11. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1976).
12. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
13. Id. at 725 (citation omitted).
14. Id.
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pendent jurisdiction was whether the claims arose from a "common
nucleus of operative fact."'
' 5
2. Ancillary jurisdiction
While pendent jurisdiction was usually utilized by plaintiffs,
ancillary jurisdiction was mostly used by defendants and third
parties. 6 These cases required that the claims "arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the plaintiffs claims."' 7  Typically,
these were claims made by a defending party "haled into court
against his will," or by someone whose "rights might be irretrievably
lost unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a federal
court."' 
8
3. Pendent-party jurisdiction
Pendent-party jurisdiction was more problematic for federal
courts in the pre-section 1367 era of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court noted in Aldinger v. Howard,19
"[t]he situation with respect to the joining of a new party... strikes
us as being both factually and legally different from the situation
facing the Court in Gibbs and its predecessors." 20 Furthermore, the
court stated, "[r]esolution of a claim of pendent-party jurisdiction,
therefore, calls for careful attention to the relevant statutory
language.",2 1 In 1989, in deciding Finley v. United States,22 the
Supreme Court, relying in part on Aldinger, determined "the Gibbs
approach would not be extended to the pendent-party field ....
The Court stated in Finley that "with respect to the addition of
parties, as opposed to the addition of only claims, we will not assume
that the full constitutional power has been congressionally
authorized, and will not read jurisdictional statutes broadly. 24
15. Id.
16. Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798, 810 (2d Cir.
1979).
17. See Vairo, supra note 5, at *257-58.
18. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365; 376 (1978).
19. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
20. Id. at 14.
21. Id. at 17.
22. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
23. Id. at 556.
24. Id. at 549.
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4. "Supplemental" jurisdiction: a change in name and a new boss
Under section 1367, supplemental jurisdiction includes
ancillary, pendent and pendent-party jurisdiction.25  Under
subsection (a), the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
a claim as long as there is a claim with an independent basis of
jurisdiction, and the supplemental claim is so related to that claim as
to form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
Constitution.26 There is general agreement that this Article III
standard is equivalent to the "common nucleus of operative fact"
standard of pendent jurisdiction.
27
The largest change comes in cases of pendent party jurisdiction.
In Finley, after determining the state of pendent-party jurisdiction,
the Court sent a direct message to Congress, stating, "[w]hatever we
say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a particular
statute can of course be changed by Congress.' 28 On December 1,
1990, Congress responded to this call, and explicitly stated in
subsection (a) that "[s]uch supplemental jurisdiction shall include
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties,"
changing the effect of Finley.29 Thus, section 1367(a) has expanded
supplemental jurisdiction in this regard.
C. Section 1367(b)-Explicit Exceptions in Diversity Jurisdiction
Cases
By drafting section 1367(a) so as to extend to the constitutional
limits of the courts' ability to exercise supplemental jurisdiction,
Congress created a large avenue through which a claimant can secure
jurisdiction over supplemental claims in federal court.3" Yet this
25. However, the Ninth Circuit stated that ancillary jurisdiction is a
separate concept, not within the purview of supplemental jurisdiction. United
States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 174 F.3d 1007, 1012 n.5 (9th Cir.
1999).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
27. See Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1175 (lst Cir.
1995) ("In enacting section 1367, Congress essentially codified the rationale
articulated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs."); William A. Fletcher,
"Common Nucleus of Operative Fact" and Defensive Set-Off. Beyond the
Gibbs Test, 74 IND. L.J. 171, 174-78 (1998); Part IV.E.
28. 490 U.S. at 556.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
30. See supra Part IV.B.
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broad grant is not without its limitations. One of these restrictions is
found in subsection (b).3 1 However, this mandatory limitation only
applies when the court's original jurisdiction is based on diversity
jurisdiction.
32
Subsection (b) restricts the court from exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over "claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties
under Rule 14 [Impleader], 19 [Compulsory Joinder], 20 [Permissive
Joinder], or 24 [Intervention]," and over "claims by persons
proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19... or seeking to
intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24." 33 In addition, this subsection
also states that supplemental jurisdiction shall not be exercised
"when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would
be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section
1332." 34
Subsection (b) is the most problematic and criticized aspect of
the supplemental jurisdiction statute.35  Although subsection (b)
appears to be a simple codification of the prior judge-made law in
this area, as set forth in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
36
there is an argument that subsection (b) goes beyond Kroger.7 Also,
there is a are question as to whether the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure listed in subsection (b) are an exclusive list, or whether a
plaintiff is also barred from asserting a claim against persons made
parties by other means not listed. This Part explores some of the
various issues of concern in cases based on diversity jurisdiction.
Thus, a litigant dealing with such a claim should be cautious with
respect to the various aspects contained in this Part.
1. Limiting diversity actions through subsection (b)-codification
of Kroger?
In order for a litigant to understand the issues that arise in the
current supplemental jurisdiction statute, it is first important for her
to understand the foundation from which the statute arose. In
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 855.
36. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
37. See McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 936-40.
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Kroger, before the enactment of section 1367, the Supreme Court
examined the issue of whether, in an action based on diversity ,of
citizenship, a plaintiff could assert a claim without an independent
basis of jurisdiction against a third-party defendant.38
In Kroger, the plaintiff asserted a claim against the defendant
based on diversity jurisdiction in the United States District Court for
the District of Nebraska. 39 The defendant then impleaded a third
party pursuant to Rule 14(a), 40 after which the plaintiff asserted a
claim against the third-party defendant.41 This third-party defendant
was from the same state as the plaintiff, and there was no
independent basis for jurisdiction over this claim.42 Consequently,
the Court examined whether or not the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction extended over this claim.43
In reaching its determination in Kroger, the Court explained that
courts have interpreted section 1332, the diversity jurisdiction
statute, as requiring complete diversity, meaning each plaintiff must
be diverse from each defendant.44 The Court stated that "federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction., 45 As such, it is of concern
that "a plaintiff could defeat the statutory requirement of complete
diversity by the simple expedient of suing only those defendants who
were of diverse citizenship and waiting for them to implead
nondiverse defendants.
' 4 6
The Court explained that while ancillary jurisdiction could be
used to confer jurisdiction over nonfederal claims involving
impleader, cross-claims, and counterclaims, the context in which the
claim that does not have its own basis of jurisdiction arises is
"crucial.4 7 In looking at the context of a claim that arises in a case
based on supplemental jurisdiction against a third-party defendant,
the Court made two important observations.48 First, the Court
38. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 384.
39. Id. at 367.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 368.
42. Id. at 370.
43. Id. at 367.
44. Id. at 373. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
45. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 374.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 375-76.
48. Id. at 376.
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explained that a third-party complaint is not always ancillary in the
salme sense as an impleader in that it depends partly on the resolution
of the initial action.49 Next, the Court explained that this case dealt
with an action brought to the federal forum by the plaintiff herself.
50
As such, the plaintiff should not have complained about being
prevented from asserting additional claims during the course of
litigation, as she was the one "who [chose] the federal rather than the
state forum and must thus accept its limitations."5' The Court held
that "ancillary jurisdiction typically involves claims by a defending
party haled into court against his will, or by another person whose
rights might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert them in an
ongoing action in a federal court." 52 This part of the analysis has set
the tone for the policy behind limiting the plaintiffs ability to assert
claims against parties joined'during the course of the litigation.
While the legislative history of section 1367(b) states, "[t]he net
effect of subsection (b) is to implement the principal rationale of
[Kroger],' 53 there is a question as to whether the text of section
1367(b) purports to extend this doctrine.54 The rest of this Part deals
with issues that arise due to the ambiguity of section 1367(b).
2. Implications for parties joined under Rule 13(h)
While section 1367(b) forbids a plaintiff from asserting a claim
against persons made parties under Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24, the
subsection remains silent as to parties joined under Rule 13(h).55
Rule 13(h) allows the joinder of additional parties "to a counterclaim
or cross-claim in accordance with the provisions of Rules 19 and
20. " 56 Suppose that P, from Michigan, sues D, from California, over
a state law claim in federal court (assume that there is diversity
jurisdiction). Then, D joins T, from Michigan, under 13(h). What
happens if P, who is also from Michigan, wants to add a claim
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29 n.16.
54. See McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 936-39 (discussing the various ways
in which Kroger has been extended by the enactment of § 1367(b)); Vairo,
supra note 5, at 264.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(h).
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against T? Does section 1367(b) prohibit P from asserting a claim
against Tjoined under Rule 13(h)?
Technically, Rule 13(h) is not listed in subsection (b) as an
exception to granting supplemental jurisdiction. Under a plain
meaning reading of the statute, it would appear that a non-diverse
plaintiff could file a claim against a party joined under Rule 13(h),
and that her claim would have supplemental jurisdiction.5 7 Should a
court hold this to be pennissible, a plaintiff who wanted to be in the
federal forum could evade the complete diversity requirement set
forth in Strawbridge v. Curtiss.
58
However, there are several arguments that would lead to the
opposite conclusion, that a non-diverse plaintiff could not file a
claim against a third party joined under Rule 13(h). One such
argument deals with the fact that "[e]xtending supplemental
jurisdiction to claims asserted by plaintiffs against parties joined
under Rule 13(h), while denying supplemental jurisdiction to claims
by plaintiffs against parties joined, under the other enumerated
Rules, would be inconsistent with th[e] statutory intent., 59 Another
argument deals with the fact that Rule 13(h) itself depends on the
requirements of Rules 19 and 20, which are among the Rules referred
to by subsection (b). Therefore, a court "could fmd that because a
party may be joined under Rule 13(h) only when the requirements of
Rule 19 or 20 are met, their joinder is, in essence, one under those
rules, and accordingly barred by § 1367(b). ' 6 ° Clearly, a defendant
in the federal forum would applaud these two arguments, as the
result would allow her to assert additional claims while adding a
barrier preventing the plaintiff from doing the same.
3. Who is the plaintiff?
Subsection (b) is clearly a limit on the plaintiffs ability to assert
claims against non-diverse parties joined to the action.6 1 However,
57. See infra Part IV.C.4 (discussing Rule 23, which is also absent from the
text of section 1367(b), and discussing how different courts have determined
the effect of the absence of Rule 23).
58. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
59. McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 940.
60. Vairo, supra note 5, at 266; see Mayatexti, S.A. v. Liztex U.S.A., Inc.,
No. 92 CIV. 4528, 1993 WL 180,371 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1993).
61. See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Kearney, 212 F.3d 721, 726-27 (2d Cir. 2000)
("Significantly, § 1367(b) reflects Congress' intent to prevent original
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there is a question as to whether section 1367(b) takes into account
the difference between the original role a party assumes and the
posture a party may take on later. While a litigant who asserts a
claim may technically be the plaintiff, there are situations where this
party may act in a defensive posture. Likewise, there are situations
where a party that is technically the defendant may act in the posture
of a plaintiff.
One such situation arises when a party added by a defendant
asserts a claim against the original plaintiff, and the original plaintiff
files a compulsory counterclaim in response. There, the plaintiff is
clearly acting in a defensive posture, but technically she may be
asserting a claim against a non-diverse party joined under Rule 14,
19, 20, or 24. Assume a situation in which P from Michigan sues D
from California in federal district court for damages over $75,000.
Clearly, subject-matter jurisdiction is supported by diversity
jurisdiction as set forth in section 1332.62 However, life and
litigation are never so simple. Thus, assume that D then impleads T
from Michigan, via Rule 14. After being added to the suit, T decides
to file a claim through Rule 14 against P, the original plaintiff. As a
result, P has a compulsory counterclaim to T's claim against her.
Can she assert it? T is a person made a party under Rule 14, and
section 1367(b) forbids a plaintiff from asserting a claim against
persons made parties under Rule 14.63 On the other hand, P is being
put in the position of acting in a defensive posture, and not as a
plaintiff. Should this matter?64
Consider, alternatively, that P, from Michigan, sues D, from
California, for a state law claim in federal district court (assume that
diversity jurisdiction exists). Then, D asserts a counterclaim against
P and also wants to assert this claim as a cross-claim against T, a
third-party claimant, by joining T via Rule 13(h). As a result, T is
aligned as a plaintiff. Suppose further that T wants to assert a claim
against P. For section 1367(b) purposes, will the court have
plaintiffs-but not defendants or third parties-from circumventing the
requirements of diversity.").
62. For a discussion on the requirements of diversity jurisdiction, see infra
Part II.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000).
64. See McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 942-43 (addressing whether
defensive claims by plaintiffs should fall under the command of § 1367(b)).
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supplemental jurisdiction over this claim? T may not be the original
plaintiff, but T is acting like one.
Alternatively, there may be times when a defendant acts like a
plaintiff. If so, should the defendant be subject to the limitations of
subsection (b) even though the statute clearly attempts to limit claims
made by original plaintiffs? In Mayatextil, S.A. v. Liztex U.S.A.,
Inc.,65 the district court had diversity jurisdiction over the claims
initially pursued by the plaintiff. The defendants then asserted a
counterclaim against the original plaintiff. They also asserted a
cross-claim against non-diverse third parties, attempting to join them
under Rule 13(h). They asserted a counterclaim against these parties
as well.66 After the court determined that Rule 13(h) was included in
section 1367(b)-even though it was not expressly stated in the
subsection-the court determined it lacked jurisdiction over the
cross-claim. 67 However, it was the defendant, not the plaintiff, who
tried to assert a claim against a party joined under Rule 13(h).
Section 1367(b) does not bar defendants; it bars plaintiffs.
68
However, other courts have held that section 1367(b) does not
restrict defendants at all-no matter what their posture.69 In a recent
case, Air Liquide America, L.P. v. Process Service Corp., a district
court held that where a defendant attempted to join a non-diverse
counterclaim defendant under Rule 13(h), the "significant procedural
fact [was] that it [was] the defendant... seeking to join a non-
diverse counterclaim." 70 The court explained that the plain language
of section 1367(b) "applies only to claims by plaintiffs against new
parties whose addition would destroy diversity."' 71 The court further
reasoned that "[t]he entire thrust of subsection (b) is to prevent the
original plaintiff from manufacturing jurisdiction and later
interjecting a non-federal claim." 72 Thus, as this claim was made by
the original defendant, the court found it had the power to exercise
65. No. 92 CIV. 4528, 1993 WL 180,371 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1993).
66. Id. at *1-*2.
67. Id. at *3.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
69. See United Capitol Ins. Co. v. Kapiloff, 155 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 1998);
Air Liquide Am., L.P. v. Process Serv. Corp., No. CIV.A. 02-3794, 2003 WL
22,272,190 (E.D. La. Oct. 1, 2003).
70. Air Liquide Am., 2003 WL 22,272,190 at *3.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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supplemental jurisdiction over this claim.73 As a result, a defendant
in a federal forum has broader latitude to assert additional claims,
whereas a plaintiff may not have that same freedom. While it is
understandable that the plaintiff chooses the forum in which she
wants to assert her claims,74 as she is the master of her complaint,
this seems less justified when the defendant has removed the case to
the federal forum.75 However, perhaps justification lies in the fact
that the plaintiff could have asserted claims against these additional
parties in its original complaint.
4. The fate of Zahn v. International Paper Co.7 6 after the enactment
of section 1367
In addition to questions about when a plaintiff or defendant
should be barred from exercising supplemental jurisdiction in a
diversity case, there is also a question about how section 1367(b)
affects class action lawsuits brought under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3). 77 Rule 23 states, in pertinent part, that "[o]ne or
73. Id.
74. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978)
("A plaintiff cannot complain if ancillary jurisdiction does not encompass all
of his possible claims... since it is he who has chosen the federal rather than
the state forum and must thus accept its limitations.").
75. It is true that the result is the same even when the case is removed, but
if the plaintiff asserts the additional claims that would destroy diversity
jurisdiction when she first files the claim, the defendant would never have been
in the position to remove the case in the first place.
76. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
77. Provided that the requirements of the statute are met, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) allows for a class action to be maintained if:
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of
any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D)
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
Note that the language of Rule 23(b)(3)----"questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class"-echoes the concept of "so related [as
1512
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more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of [the entire class]," provided that certain conditions are
met.78  Suppose, for example, 310 property owners each own
property around a lake that the defendant allegedly has been
polluting.79 Several of the owners want to assert a class action on
their behalf and in representation of the other 300 owners with
lakefront property via Rule 23(b)(3) in federal district court. None of
the plaintiffs are from the same state as any of the defendants, so all
potential members of the class are diverse from the defendant.
80
However, it is questionable as to whether all members of the class
will seek damages exceeding $75,000.81 In order for each member to
have an independent basis of jurisdiction over her claim, she must
show both diversity of citizenship and that the matter in controversy
exceeds the jurisdictional amount required by section 1332.82 What
happens if, as here, despite the fact that all members of the class are
diverse from the defendants, some of the members of the class do not
meet the amount in controversy requirement of section 1332?
Should the district court dismiss the claims of the members who do
not meet the jurisdictional amount so that these members have to re-
file their cases in state court even though their claims are so related
as to form part of the same case or controversy? Or, alternatively,
should the court allow these members to stay in court along with
their fellow class members via supplemental jurisdiction?
Like the above example, the cases discussed in this section do
not deal specifically with parties who spoil complete diversity
jurisdiction per se; rather these cases deal with the amount in
controversy requirement of section 1332.83 The real question is
to] form part of the same case or controversy under Article III." See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a). This similarity is apparent given the common nucleus of operative
fact test offered in Gibbs.
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
79. These facts are a variation of Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S.
291 (1973).
80. For a discussion on diversity jurisdiction and what factors determine
whether parties are diverse, see Part II.
81. The jurisdictional amount currently set by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
82. For a discussion of the requirements for diversity jurisdiction, see
generally supra Part II, which discusses developments in diversity jurisdiction
including diversity and amount in controversy requirements.
83. Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted § 1332 as solely
requiring that the named class representatives in a class action be diverse from
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whether the concept of supplemental jurisdiction, as codified in
section 1367, allows additional parties in a class action to bootstrap
their claims onto a member of the class who has an independent basis
of jurisdiction, or whether each of the members must satisfy the
amount in controversy requirement on her own in order to have her
day in federal court.
Prior to the enactment of section 1367(b), the rule regarding
who must satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of section
1332 was clear. The Court held in Zahn v. International Paper Co.
84
that "[e]ach plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the
jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be
dismissed from the case-'one plaintiff may not ride in on another's
coattails.' 85  Furthermore, if no plaintiff can meet the requisite
amount in controversy, the federal district court must dismiss the
case in its entirety.
86
However, there is a question as to whether the enactment of
section 1367 has altered this rule. This question arises because the
text of section 1367(b) explicitly states exceptions to section 1367(a),
but absent from these enumerated exceptions is Rule 23.87 The effect
of this silence in subsection (b) is the heart of the debate as to
whether the rule of Zahn remains viable. Accordingly, the question
is whether the silence of subsection (b) should be interpreted by the
courts as extending supplemental jurisdiction over parties added by
plaintiffs under Rule 23-the exact action forbidden by Zahn- or as
keeping Zahn intact. Currently, the circuits are split on these
the defendants. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365-
67 (1921). Furthermore, currently the proposed Class Action Fairness Act of
1999, if passed, would provide for minimal diversity in class actions in order to
prevent a class from avoiding federal court by including a non-diverse member
in its class. S. 353, 106th Cong.; see Vairo, supra note 5, at 232-33.
However, although individual class members need not all be diverse parties,
Cauble, 255 U.S. at 365-67, there is still a question as to whether each
individual class member must meet the amount in controversy requirement of §
1332. See Mehlenbacher v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 216 F.3d 291, 297-98 (2d
Cir. 2000).
84. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
85. Id. at 301 (quoting Zahn, 469 F.2d at 1035).
86. Id.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000); see In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 527
(5th Cir. 1995), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, sub nom. Free v.
Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000).
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questions. 88 This issue is important for class action plaintiffs who
want to remain in the federal forum and for defendants who want to
remove class action suits against them to the federal forum. This
issue is of vital concern because the amount in controversy
requirement set forth in section 1332 has increased from $10,000, in
the days of Zahn,89 to $75,000. 90 As a result, it is feasibly more
difficult for each member of a class to meet the jurisdictional amount
requirement, and the ability to aggregate claims may prove a crucial
determinant for many class actions to remain in federal court. This
Sub-Part examines the Zahn ruling and looks at the conflicting
viewpoints of the different circuits as to whether or not the
enactment of section 1367 overruled Zahn.
a. pre-section 1367 and the rule of Zahn v. International
Paper Co.9'
In order to understand the current debate about whether or not
each claimant in a class action lawsuit must meet the jurisdictional
amount in controversy, it is important to first understand the
historical view taken by the courts. Before the enactment of section
1367, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Zahn.92 In Zahn, four owners
of a lakefront property brought a diversity action on behalf of a class
that included over 200 other unnamed class members.93 The district
court refused to allow the action to proceed as a class action, finding
that each member in the class did not suffer damages in excess of the
amount in controversy requirement set forth in section 1332. 94
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, holding that each of the
members, including those in the unnamed class, had to meet the
jurisdictional amount requirement on her own, or she would find her
88. See infra Part IV.C.4.b.
89. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 293 n.1.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
91. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 291-92.
94. Id. at 292. Note that at the time that the Court decided Zahn, § 1332
required that the matter in controversy exceed $10,000. Id. at 293 n.1.
However, today the matter in controversy must exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (2000). For a discussion on the amount in controversy, see supra Part
II.C.
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claim dismissed.95 The Court found that its prior decision in Snyder
v. Harris96 was controlling.97 In Snyder, the Court held that plaintiffs
in a class action could not aggregate their claims in order to meet the
amount in controversy requirement of section 1332.98 Thus, a
federal district court could only retain jurisdiction over the plaintiffs
in a class action suit whose individual claims exceeded this minimal
amount.99 Thus, according to Zahn, each plaintiff in a class action
suit has to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement. 00 Those
that do not meet this condition must be dismissed from the case,
regardless of whether others allege sufficient claims. 101
The majority opinion clearly held that there was no
jurisdictional basis for the plaintiffs who did not meet the amount in
controversy requirement. 102 Furthermore, the Court was not willing
95. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 292, 301.
96. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
97. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 300.
98. Id. at 298-99. The only exception to this rule mentioned in Zahn was
that plaintiffs who joined to assert a single claim in which they had "'a
common and undivided interest"' could aggregate their claims. Id. at 294
(quoting Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911)).
99. Id. at 298-99.
100. Id. at 301-02.
101. Id. at 300.
102. Id. However, in his dissent Justice Brennan found that the federal
district courts could have jurisdiction over members of the class that did not
meet the amount in controversy requirement through the concept of ancillary
jurisdiction. Id. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan explained that just
as the concept of ancillary jurisdiction had allowed jurisdiction over
compulsory counterclaims and intervention, so too should it allow jurisdiction
over class actions when one party's claim satisfied the amount in controversy
requirements. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan found that denial of
ancillary jurisdiction for class actions would impose a larger burden on the
judiciary as a whole and would impede the ability of members of a class to
assert their claims. Id. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Brennan
stated that the majority's reasoning was inconsistent with a prior case, Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), where the Court held that if
the original plaintiffs and defendants satisfied diversity requirements,
intervention by non-diverse members of a class would not destroy the courts'
jurisdiction. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan stated
that he did not understand why the approach in Ben-Hur was not extended to
the amount in controversy requirement of § 1332. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Thus, Brennan concluded that as long as the original plaintiff met the
jurisdictional requirements, the federal district courts might have jurisdiction
over the rest of the members of the class through the concept of ancillary
jurisdiction, whether or not the later members were non-diverse or simply
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to overrule the amount in controversy requirement stated in Snyder,
noting "[a]t this time, we have no good reason to disagree with
[Snyder] or with the historic construction of the jurisdictional
statutes, left undisturbed by Congress over these many years."
10 3
The Court added "[a]s the Court thought in [Snyder] the matter must
rest there, absent further congressional action.
''04
In 1990, seventeen years after the Zahn decision, Congress
acted. It did so not by changing section 1332, but by adding a new
statute dealing with supplemental jurisdiction. 10 5 A question thus
arose as to whether the passage of section 1367 overruled the Court's
holding in Zahn, or whether the passage of the supplemental
jurisdiction statute left the rule of Zahn standing.
b. post-section 1367 and the confusion of Zahn
Although section 1367(a) extends supplemental jurisdiction over
claims involving "the joinder or intervention of additional parties,"
subsection (b) specifically prohibits the use of supplemental
jurisdiction in diversity cases over "claims by plaintiffs against
persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be
joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to
intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 ....,106 However, this list of
exceptions fails to mention Rule 23. Courts have disagreed as to
whether the effect of this silence is to overrule Zahn or to leave the
rule undisturbed. 0 7 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to decisively
failed the jurisdictional-amount requirement. Id. at 309-10 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
103. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301.
104. Id. at 302.
105. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
106. Id.
107. Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc., 230 F.3d 974, 977 (7th Cir. 2000)
("Since the passage of the supplemental jurisdiction statute... there has been a
conflict in the circuits on the question whether Zahn's holding survives the
enactment of § 1367."); In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1995)
("Supplemental jurisdiction over the unnamed plaintiffs' claims has been an
open question since Congress passed [§ 1367]."), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided Court, sub nom. Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 U.S. 333
(2000).
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rule on the issue. . -Therefore, the circuits have been left with little
authority, and have remained split on the issue. 109 The courts finding
that the enactment of section 1367 overruled Zahn tend to find so
based on the plain meaning of the statute without placing much
weight on legislative history. 110 On the other hand, the courts
finding that the rule of Zahn retains its vitality seem heavily
influenced by legislative history, whether they claim to base their
holding on the plain text of the statute or the legislative history
itself. 1"
i. the majority view: Zahn overruled
Though there is no consensus as to the effect of section 1367,
the majority of circuit courts ruling on the issue, including the
Fourth,112 Fifth, 1 3 Seventh, 1 4 Ninth," 5 and Eleventh 1 6 Circuits,
have found that section 1367 overrules Zahn.
All five of these circuit courts of appeals reached their
conclusions based upon the plain meaning of the statute." 17 Mainly,
these courts base their holdings on the absence of Rule 23 from the
enumerated exceptions to section 1367(a) set forth in subsection
108. Although it appeared that the Court would resolve the issue in its
decision in Free v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000), it did not.
Rather, the Court affirmed a judgment by an equally divided court in a per
curiam opinion finding that § 1367(b) overrules Zahn leaving the issue open
for debate. Id.
109. See generally Joseph J. Shannon, Comment, Is Zahn Gone? The Effect
of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 on the "No Aggregation Doctrine," 19 TOURO L. REv.
495, 505 (2002) (discussing the circuit split on the effect of section 1367 on the
holding in Zahn).
110. See Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d at 525.
111. See Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir.
1999); Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631 (10th Cir. 1998).
112. See Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114-19 (4th Cir. 2001).
113. Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d at 529.
114. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599,
607 (7th Cir. 1997).
115. Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 933-40 (9th Cir. 2001).
116. Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
117. See Allapattah Servs, 333 F.3d at 1254; Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 115-19;
Gibson, 261 F.3d at 934, 940; Brand Name, 123 F.3d at 607; Abbott Labs., 51
F.3d at 527-28.
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(b).118 As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated in the most
recent of these cases to be decided, section 1367(a) is a broad grant
of supplemental jurisdiction, and section 1367(b) serves to narrow
that broad grant of jurisdiction in diversity cases; furthermore, "it is a
well-accepted rule of statutory construction in this Circuit that
'where a statute explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general
grant of power, courts should be reluctant to imply additional
exceptions in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the
contrary."' 119 Thus, the court found that because Rule 23 is absent
from the list of exceptions in section 1367(b) it is not an
exception. 120
Furthermore, after finding that the plain language of the statute
was clear, these courts have refused to look into legislative intent,
stating they cannot do so unless the statute is unclear or
ambiguous. 2 1 Moreover, both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits stated
that even if it was clerical error or oversight that Rule 23 was not
inserted into the list of exceptions in subsection (b) that is of no
concern because "the statute is the sole repository of congressional
intent where the statute is clear and does not demand an absurd
result."'122 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained, reading
118. See Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d at 527 (finding that while subsection (a)
grants supplemental jurisdiction, subsection (b) "carves exceptions," and
"[s]ignificantly, class actions are not among the exceptions").
119. Allapattah Servs, 333 F.3d at 1256 (quoting United States ex rel.
Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1502 (11 th Cir. 1991)).
120. Id.
121. See Allapattah Servs., 333 F.3d at 1253-56; Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 117;
Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d at 528. In Rosmer, although the plaintiff argued that the
circuit split was evidence of the fact that the statute was ambiguous, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that just because other circuits have acted in a
contrary manner, this did not "negate th[e] circuit's duty to interpret the text of
the enactment." 263 F.3d at 118. The court held that it had a duty to interpret
the statute, and that just because another circuit had done differently did not
prevent the circuit from finding that this particular statute was clear and
unambiguous. Id. Compare with Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631,
640 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that the circuit split supports the idea that the
statute is truly ambiguous).
122. Gibson, 261 F.3d at 939-40; Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d at 529 (citing W.
Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1991); United States v.
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994)). The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated its concern over following the clear meaning of the text of the
statute, stating that if courts began to ignore the plain meaning of a statute
because the legislative history demonstrated a contrary intent, then the plain
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subsection (b) as overruling Zahn does not result in an "absurd or
difficult-to-justify result."12 3 As such, these circuits have held that
the plain meaning of the statute controls, and the plain and
unambiguous meaning of section 1367(b) is that the rule from Zahn
no longer stands. 124  Thus, in these jurisdictions, as long as one
named plaintiff satisfies the jurisdictional amount requirement, other
named and unnamed class members can "piggyback on that
plaintiffs claim" through the use of supplemental jurisdiction.
125
ii. minority view: Zahn sustained
The minority opinion, consisting of the Third, 126 Eighth, 127 and
Tenth128 Circuits, is that section 1367 has not disturbed the U.S.
Supreme Court's prior ruling in Zahn. 129 However, these circuits
differ with respect to their reasoning as to why Zahn is still good law.
While the Tenth and Eighth Circuits rely on the plain meaning of the
statute,130 the Third Circuit found the statute ambiguous and
therefore relied on legislative history.
131
In Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., 13 2 the Tenth Circuit was the
first of the Federal Courts of Appeals to decide that Zahn survived
the enactment of section 1367.133 The court first determined the
statute was clear and unambiguous but held that the plain language
meaning of statutes in general would be placed in jeopardy. Gibson, 261 F.3d
at 940.
123. Gibson, 261 F.3d at 939.
124. See Allapattah Servs., 333 F.3d at 1254; Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 115-19;;
Gibson, 261 F.3d at 934, 940; Brand Name, 123 F.3d at 607; Abbott Labs., 51
F.3d at 527-28.
125. Brand Name, 123 F.3d at 607.
126. Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 218-22 (3d
Cir. 1999).
127. Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 960-62 (8th Cir. 2000).
128. Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 637-41 (10th Cir. 1998).
129. The Second Circuit may be the next circuit to agree with this minority
view. While the Second Circuit has yet to decide the issue, in a recent case the
court noted that the majority of courts in that circuit have held that Zahn is still
good law. Fox v. Cheminova, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
130. Trimble, 232 F.3d at 961; Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 638-39.
131. Meritcare Inc., 166 F.3d at 222.
132. 160 F.3d 631 (10th Cir. 1998).
133. Id. at 638. Prior to this case, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits had both
decided that the effect of the enactment of § 1367 was to overrule Zahn, but no
other circuit courts of appeals had reached a conclusion. Id. at 639.
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of the statute expressed that section 1367 did not overrule Zahn.' 34 It
stated that other circuits, in deciding that the statute displaced Zahn,
relied solely on the fact that Rule 23 was absent from the exceptions
enumerated in section 1367(b). 135 However, the court stated that "a
literal and textually faithful reading of § 1367(a) leads to the
opposite conclusion. ... ,,136 The court explained that subsection (b)
only dealt with the plaintiffs claims added after the initial suit
began, whereas class actions under Rule 23 dealt with the initial case
itself.'37 Ironically, the court looked to legislative history to support
its finding on the plain meaning of the statute, quoting the legislative
record declaring that:
"In diversity-only actions the district courts may not hear
plaintiffs' supplemental claims when exercising
supplemental jurisdiction would encourage plaintiffs to
evade the jurisdictional requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by
the simple expedient of naming initially only those
defendants whose joinder satisfies section 1332's
requirements and later adding claims not within original
federal jurisdiction against other defendants who have
intervened or been joined on a supplemental basis."
'1 38
Thus, the court read "original jurisdiction" as being different for
diversity suits than for federal question suits. 139 Whereas in federal
question cases, original jurisdiction seems to refer to the court having
federal question jurisdiction over at least one claim, original
jurisdiction in a suit based on diversity seems to imply something
else. 140 The court explained that in a diversity suit, section 1332
confers original jurisdiction and requires plaintiffs to meet the
requisite jurisdictional amount.' 4' Thus, the court determined that
134. Id. at 638-39.
135. Id. at 639.
136. Id. at 640.
137. Id. at 639-40.
138. Id. at 639 n.7 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875).
139. See James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The
Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 109 (1999). Cf. Gibson
v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 934-40 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing and largely
rejecting the Tenth Circuit's reasoning).
140. See Gibson, 261 F.3d at 936-37.
141. Id.
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supplemental jurisdiction could apply only after the plaintiffs
demonstrated in their initial complaint that all parties met the
requirements of original jurisdiction. 142  Accordingly, the court
concluded that the plain meaning of section 1367 did not overrule
Zahn.143 The Eighth Circuit, in Trimble v. Asarco, Inc.,144 adopted
the Tenth Circuit's holding in Leonhardt verbatim.1
45
However, after deciding the text of section 1367 clearly
supported the rationale that the rule of Zahn remains viable, the
Tenth Circuit assumed the statute was ambiguous, because two
circuit courts of appeals reached the opposite conclusion and
commentators were equally divided.1 46 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit
examined and found support for its interpretation of the statute in the
legislative history of section 1367. 4 7 It stated the legislative history
"expressly states that § 1367[b] 'is not intended to affect the
jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-only
class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to
[Finley]."",148 The court further stated that the House report cited to
Zahn as an example of those requirements that were to remain intact
after the passage of section 1332.149 From this legislative report, the
court concluded that "Congress did not intend to overrule the
historical rules prohibiting aggregation of claims, including Zahn's
prohibition of such aggregation in diversity class actions.' 50  The
court further recognized that even the circuits that had reached the
opposite result found that Congress did not intend for the statute to
overrule Zahn. 151
142. Id.; see Pfander, supra note 139, at 109.
143. Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 641.
144. 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000).
145. See id. at 961. In fact, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals simply
quoted an entire passage from Leonhardt dealing with the plain meaning of the
statute, and adopted it as its own. Id. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals seemed to rely more on the fact that the plain meaning of the statute
supported its conclusion than it did on the legislative history; however, it did
state that the legislative history supported its conclusion. Id. at 962.
146. Id. at 639 n.6, 640.
147. Id. at 640.
148. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at. 28, 29 & n.17 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6974).
149. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 28, 29 & n.17 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6974).
150. Id. at 640-41.
151. Id. at 641 n.9.
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While the Eighth and Tenth Circuits concluded that both the
plain text of section 1367 and the legislative history of section 1367
left the ruling in Zahn intact,152 in Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury
Insurance Co. 153 the Eighth Circuit determined that section 1367 was
ambiguous, and therefore relied on the legislative history in making
it decision.
1 54
The court stated that section 1367(b) did not list Rule 23 as an
exception, and that "[s]ubsection (b) notes a number of instances
where 'exercising supplemental jurisdiction.. .would be inconsistent
with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.'''115 However,
the court found that even though Rule 23 was absent from this list,
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over claims through Rule 23
would be clearly inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of
section 1332.156 Furthermore, the court stated that even if it did not
find the statute ambiguous, it would nonetheless turn to the
legislative history because the literal application of the statute was at
odds with Congressional intent.' 57 As a result of the court's finding
that the legislative history was in favor of retaining the viability of
Zahn, the court held that section 1367 did not change the
applicability of Zahn.
iii. undecided circuits: Zahn unclear
While a majority of the circuit courts have reached the issue as
to the effect of section 1367 on the holding of Zahn, there are a few
circuit courts that have yet to decide the issue. However, a review of
other cases decided in their districts provides insight as to where
these Circuits may be heading.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals first heard the issue in
Mehlenbacher v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc.,158 where it declined to decide
whether the enactment of section 1367 left Zahn undisturbed.159 The
152. Id. at641.
153. 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999).
154. Id. at 222.
155. Id. at 221 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b)).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 222 (citing United States v. Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 313 (3d Cir.
1998); Cf Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 939 (2001) (holding that
§ 1367 did not produce absurd results that were hard to justify).
158. 216 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2000).
159. Id.
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court briefly examined the circuit split and stated that "the Supreme
Court itself has to date been unable definitively to resolve the
question."'160 The court raised the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction
sua sponte and stated it would not decide the issue because it would
be "premature," as the parties did not have a chance to brief or argue
the issue. 16 1 Specifically, the court was concerned with the fact that
there was no assertion that even one of the plaintiffs met the amount
in controversy requirement. 162 If none of the plaintiffs could meet
the minimal jurisdictional amount, then the court could not have
jurisdiction over the case, even if Zahn was no longer the law.
163
Thus, the court remanded the case to the district court, stating that if
the district court were to find that one of the plaintiffs met the full
requirements of section 1332, the district court could decide the issue
of Zahn.164 However, despite the fact that the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals has not affirmatively decided the issue, the district court
cases from that circuit appear to demonstrate that the circuit is
overwhelmingly in favor of the proposition that Zahn survived
section 1367.165 In fact, in the recent case, Fox v. Cheminova, Inc.,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
actually surveyed views regarding the continuing viability of Zahn
and found that although the Second Circuit has not yet ruled on the
issue, the majority of courts in the circuit have held that Zahn is still
good law. 1
66
Like the court in Mehlenbacher, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals has recognized the split in authority over the issue, but has
not addressed the question. In Speilman v. Genzyme Corp.,1 6 7 the
court determined it did not need to decide the issue because there
was a question as to whether even one plaintiff had satisfied the full
requirements of section 1332.168 However, unlike the district courts
160. Id. at 297 (citing Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000)).
161. Id. at 295, 297-98.
162. Id. at298.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 298-99.
165. See Freeman v. Great Lakes Energy Partners, L.L.C., 144 F. Supp. 2d
201, 210 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[E]very district court in this circuit that has
addressed the issue has held that Zahn is still good law.").
166. 213 F.R.D. 113, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
167. 251 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001).
168. See id.; supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
1524
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
of the Second Circuit, the district courts of the First Circuit do not
tend to overwhelmingly lean toward one side of this issue. 169 While
all of the districts have not yet decided this issue, two district courts
have decided the issue. The United States District Court of
Massachusetts has decided this issue several times, 170 finally
determining in Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. that "Zahn is
dead. 171 The court in Payne disagreed with the Tenth Circuit and
followed the Ninth Circuit view, finding that the text of section 1367
in no way hints that Zahn remains good law. 172 The court was also
skeptical about the legislative history, but found that it did not need
to "address the intricacies of Congressional intent" because it found
that the text of section 1367 was clear and unambiguous.'
73
Legislative intent was thus irrelevant. 174 However, the United States
District Court of Puerto Rico, in Arias v. American Airlines, held, in
the alternative, that the enactment of section 1367 did not overrule
Zahn.'
75
While the First and Second Circuits' Courts of Appeal have
considered the Zahn issue and refused to decide it, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals has yet to address the issue.
176
D. The Discretion of the Court-Another Hurdle
A district court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction can be
analogized to a baseball game. If a litigant can show that her claim
is so related as to form part of the same case or controversy, she has
169. See Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 43, 48
(D. Mass. 2002).
170. The court in Payne stated that two courts in its own district reached
opposite conclusions on this issue. Id. (citing Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 177 F.R.D. 54, 60 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that § 1367 did
overrule Zahn); Mayo v. Key Fin. Servs., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 277, 277 (D.
Mass. 1993) (holding that § 1367 reaffirmed Zahn)).
171. 229 F. Supp. 2d at 48.
172. Id. at 50-52.
173. Id. at 51-52.
174. See id.
175. 163 F. Supp. 2d 111, 115 (D.P.R. 2001).
176. The most recent Sixth Circuit case dealing with the issue was an
unpublished case decided in 1991 that did not even acknowledge the effect
§ 1367 might have had on Zahn. Dulin v. Trans Union Credit Information Co.,
No. 90-6209, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 12675 (6th Cir. June 11, 1991).
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made it to first base. 177 Next, if there is no federal statute that bars
supplemental jurisdiction over the claim, this litigant can easily make
it to second base. 178 However, in order to reach third base, she has to
make sure subsection (b) does not apply to her supplemental claim;
otherwise, she is out.179 Assuming she makes it to third base, she
still has not reached home plate. In order to do so, she will still have
to survive the exceptions listed in section 1367(c). Under subsection
(c), it is the judge, as umpire, who gets to make the call as to whether
she is out. Simply stated, although the litigant who wants to be in the
federal forum may have met the broad requirements of subsection
(a), and may have escaped the clutches of subsection (b), subsection
(c) provides yet another hurdle. However, unlike subsection (b),
section 1367(c) is permissive, not mandatory, and is within the
court's discretion.
Section 1367(c) deals with when the court may, at its own
discretion, refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 80 Yet, the
question arises: How broad is this discretion given to the court?
Must the court have a specific reason for dismissing the claim? Can
a court refuse to extend jurisdiction over a claim that otherwise
meets the requirements of section 1367 simply because it does not
feel like it? Moreover, if the district court decides that the federal
forum is not the proper place for a supplemental claim to be heard,
can it, at its discretion, dismiss the entire case, including the claims
over which the court has original jurisdiction?
While it may be safe to assert that the discretion doled to the
court via section 1367(c) does not hinge on the personal feelings and
mood swings of the district court, there is still some confusion as to
exactly what this "discretion" entails. Once again, the enactment of
section 1367 has caused some confusion as to the current meaning of
the rule and as to whether or not the doctrine remains the same as it
was before the enactment of section 1367.181
177. For a discussion on this requirement, see supra Part IV.B.
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
179. See supra Part IV.C.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
181. See Shirin Malkani, Upside Down and Inside Out: Appellate Review of
Discretion Under the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 28 US.C. § 1367,
1997 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 661, 672 (1997) ("While Section 1367(b) may have
been a 'nightmare in draftsmanship' to critics, subsection (c) created equal
uncertainty. The fundamental issue was whether subsection (c) was intended
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Before Congress enacted section 1367, the judge-made law of
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction regarding discretion of judges, as
stated in Gibbs, was a flexible doctrine.' 82 The question now is
whether section 1367(c) has changed this flexible standard into one
that is more rigid. The issue, more specifically, is whether the
court's discretion is limited to the list of enumerated considerations
contained in section 1367(c), or whether the court's discretion is still
the flexible standard that it was in the days of Gibbs. This Part will
explain the different views as to whether section 1367(c) has
changed the doctrine of discretion. In addition, it will examine the
question as to whether a district court may use its discretion to
dismiss a case in its entirety through section 1367(c) by analogy to
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
1. Discretion of the court under section 1367(a)-(d)
Section 1367(c) states four instances where the court "may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim."'183 These
include: (1) where a "claim raises a novel or complex issue of State
law;' 1 84 (2) where the claim "substantially predominates" over those
claims over which the court has original jurisdiction; 185 (3) where the
court has "dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction;"'' 86 and (4) where "in exceptional circumstances, there
are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.' ' 187  The
question that arises is whether this is an exclusive list, or simply an
to codify prior case law or to modify the analysis of Gibbs and its progeny.");
Joseph N. Akrotirianakis, Comment, Learning to Follow Directions: When
District Courts Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Under
28 US.C. § 1367(c), 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 995, 1009 (1998) ("In practice,
courts have disagreed over whether § 1367 was merely intended to overrule the
Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United States and to codify the doctrines
of pendent, ancillary and pendent party jurisdiction, while at the same time
preserving the discretion to decline jurisdiction that district courts enjoyed
under Gibbs.").
182. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966).
183. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
184. Id. § 1367(c)(1).
185. Id. § 1367(c)(2).
186. Id. § 1367(c)(3).
187. Id. § 1367(c)(4). For a detailed discussion on issues arising in
subsections (c)(1)-(4), see Jon D. Corey, Comment, The Discretionary
Exercise of Supplemental Jurisdiction Under the Supplemental Jurisdiction
Statute, 1995 BYUL. REv. 1263, 1271-97.
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effort to codify the judge-made rule that the district court's discretion
is one of flexibility. A litigant who wants to remain in the federal
forum, or who conversely wants to evade it, should be aware of the
different views regarding this issue. Litigants in circuits holding that
the list in section 1367(c) is exclusive should understand that
subsection (c) will provide them with a narrow exit, while litigants in
circuits that have upheld the law as stated in Gibbs should
understand that subsection (c) is a broad avenue that may suddenly
call for their departure from the federal forum. Furthermore, this
issue is especially important for a litigant who wants to evade the
federal forum to understand, as some courts have held, that the court
is not obliged to do a section 1367(c) analysis unless requested to do
so. 1 88 Therefore, a litigant who wants to leave the federal forum
should be aware of the different arguments she can raise under this
subsection. If she fails to do so, she should not expect the court to
address the issue on its own. 189 Conversely, this is good news for the
litigant who wants to stay in federal court. If her opponent fails to
address this argument, she "steals home."
a. pre-section 1367: discretion as set forth in Gibbs
Long before Congress enacted section 1367, the Supreme Court,
in its decision in Gibbs, articulated the judge-made law regarding
judicial discretion as to the dismissal of supplemental claims. 190 In
that case, the Court held that "pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of
discretion, not of plaintiff's right."' 19' The Court explained that the
policy behind allowing the court to dismiss claims that would
otherwise be permissible consists of "judicial economy, convenience
and fairness to litigants" as well as interests of promoting "comity
188. See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000-01 (9th Cir.
1997); Myers v. County of Lake, 30 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1058 (1994); Doe v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 871
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam); see also Kan. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v.
Reimer & Kroger Assocs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 1996)
(distinguishing between the district court's power to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over claims and the advisability of doing so); Rodriguez v. Doral
Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the mere fact
that the court has dismissed the supporting federal claim on the merits "does
not, by itself, require that all pendent state-law claims be jettisoned").
189. See cases cited supra note 188.
190. United Mine Works v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966).
191. Id. at 726 (citations omitted).
1528
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
and... justice."'192 As a result, a consideration of these factors was a
crucial part of a district court's determination as to whether to extend
the jurisdiction of the court over a pendent claim.1 93 As the Court
later articulated in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, this
standard is quite flexible.'
94
To guide the district courts in applying this flexible standard, the
Court in Gibbs provided several scenarios under which it would
appear that the court should dismiss a claim.' 95  Under these
scenarios, the court was to dismiss a claim where "the federal claims
[were] dismissed before trial," when "it appeared that the state issues
substantially predominate[d]," and when there were other "reasons
independent of jurisdictional considerations, such as the likelihood of
jury confusion."'196 Under judge-made law, the court's discretion
was not limited to specific considerations. Rather, the Gibbs court
simply listed some guidelines and stated that policy concerns were to
play crucial factors in the courts' decisions. 197 A question arises as
to whether Congress intended to codify these factors and scenarios in
section 1367(c)(l)-(4), or whether the new list is more strict.
b. post-section 1367. the circuit split on discretion
With the enactment of section 1367, the question now is whether
this flexible doctrine that relies on factors of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity survives, or whether, section
1367(c) restricts the court's discretion to an enumerated list of
considerations.' The circuits are split as to the effect of section
1367 on the ability of a court to use its discretion in exercising
supplemental jurisdiction. 1
99
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988).
195. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Akrotirianakis, supra note 181, at 1009.
199. See id.
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i. the majority view: judicial discretion in exercising
supplemental jurisdiction
The majority view, consisting of the First,200 Third, 1 Fourth,20 2
Sixth,203 Seventh20 4 and District of Columbia 20 5 Circuits, is that
section 1367(c) is merely a codification of Gibbs and leaves broad
discretion to the district courts to determine whether to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim. These cases seem to focus on
the fact that when Congress enacted section 1367 it did so with the
intent of codifying the judge-made principles of pendent and
pendent-party jurisdiction stated in Gibbs, including the principles
concerning when a court may decline to hear a claim that it would
otherwise be allowed to hear.20 6 Therefore, these cases conclude that
district courts have "broad discretion" and "wide latitude" in
determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.20 7  The
key to determining how the court should exercise its broad discretion
lies in looking at the totality of circumstances and considering such
factors as 'judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.
208
These circuit courts have given great deference to district court
discretion. A district court in these circuits does not need to
articulate its reasons for dismissing a claim under subsection (c) in
order for its decision to be upheld, as long as it does not appear to be
200. Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2003);
Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (lst Cir. 1995).
201. De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 2003);
Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995).
202. Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995).
203. Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 196 F.3d 617, 620
(6th Cir. 1999).
204. Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th
Cir. 1993); Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher & Newman, Ltd., 140 F.3d 716,
727-28 (7th Cir. 1998).
205. Diven v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 689, 38 F.3d 598, 600-01
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
206. See Lancaster, 45 F.3d at 788; Brazinski, 6 F.3d at 1182.
207. See Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2003);
Penn Cent. Corp., 196 F.3d at 620; Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d
1346, 1354 (7th Cir. 1997); Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at 110; Rodriguez v. Doral
Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st Cir. 1995);.
208. De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 2003);
Che, 324 F.3d at 37; Lancaster, 196 F.3d at 620; Kennedy, 140 F.3d at 727;
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); Shanaghan, 58
F.3d at 110; see Rodriguez, 57 F.3d at 1177.
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209a clear abuse of discretion. As such, a litigant who prefers to leave
the federal forum has broader latitude to argue the court should
dismiss the claim under subsection (c).
ii. the minority view: judicial discretion in exercising
supplemental jurisdiction is limited to the list containedin section 1367(c)
While the majority of Circuit Courts of Appeals view section
1367(c) as a codification of judge-made law, a minority, consisting
of the Second,210 Eighth,21' Ninth, 212 and Eleventh 213 Circuits, have
held that section 1367(c) has changed a district court's discretion to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction from that of a flexible standard to
that of a limited choice defined by the itemized list of subsection (c).
The reasoning of these courts varies; however, most of these courts
rely both on the text and structure of section 1367(c), as well as on
the legislative history of the statute.214
Foremost, these courts have found that the text and structure of
section 1367 reveal a change to the pre-section 1367 standard as
stated in Gibbs.215  The crux of this argument centers on the
structural differences between subsections (a) and (c). Section
209. See Rodriguez, 57 F.3d at 1175-78 ("Here, choosing not to remand
would effectively ignore the district court's special competence in the realm of
discretionary decision making.").
210. Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2003);
Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 723 (3d Cir. 2002); Itar-Tass
Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 447 (2d Cir.
1998).
211. McLaurin v. F.C. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 1994); Innovative
Home Health Care, Inc. v. P.T.-O.T. Assocs. of the Black Hills, 141 F.3d
1284, 1287 (8th Cir. 1998).
212. Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997);
Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545,
1555-61 (9th Cir. 1994).
213. In re City of Mobile, 75 F.3d 605, 607 (11 th Cir. 1996).
214. See Itar-Tass, 140 F.3d at 447; Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1555-61.
The Eleventh Circuit has come to the same conclusion as the other circuits
discussed in this section. However, it did not state its reason for determining
that the former principle of allowing a court to exercise discretion in the
interest of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness was no longer the law
and that, therefore, the district court must state a reason enumerated in
§ 1367(c)(1)-(4) as to why it dismissed the claim. In re City of Mobil, 75 F.3d
at 607.
215. See Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1555-61; McLaurin, 30 F.3d at 984.
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1367(a) states "the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction;" while subsection (c) states that the district courts may
exercise discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction. 16
Therefore, on the one hand, subsection (a) states that supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim is mandatory, while, on the other hand
217subsection (c) is not a mandatory provision. These cases suggest
that "[b]y use of the word 'shall,' the statute makes clear that if
power is conferred under section 1367(a), and its exercise is not
prohibited by section 1367(b), a court can decline to assert
supplemental jurisdiction over a pendent claim only if one of the four
categories specifically enumerated in section 1367(c) applies. 2 18
In addition to looking at the relation between subsection (a) and
subsection (c), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals identified another
aspect of the statute that demonstrates that section 1367 has modified
prior judge-made law in this area. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that the catch-all provision, section 1367(c)(4), is
constructed in a narrower fashion than the law as stated in Gibbs.2 19
The court explained that section 1367(c)(4) allows a court to use
discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over a claim "only
if the circumstances are quite unusual., 220 Accordingly, the court
stated that section 1367(c)(4) is more narrow than the Gibbs catch
all, which broadly serves to be consistent with the values of
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.
22 1
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), & (c) (2000).
217. McLaurin, 30 F.3d at 984-85 ("the word 'shall'... is a mandatory
command .... '[S]hall' does not mean 'may' or 'is permitted to'; 'shall' has
been consistently understood to mean that something is required.").
218. Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1555-56 ; see Itar-Tass, 140 F.3d at
447; McLaurin, 30 F.3d at 984-85. Compare Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum
Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[Section 1367] surely did
not change [the judge-made principles of pendent jurisdiction as stated in
Gibbs] merely by providing that the district judge 'may' relinquish
supplemental jurisdiction. .. ."), with John B. Oakley, supra note 7, at 766-67
("By the juxtaposition of sections 1367(a) and 1367(c) Congress appears to
have created a strong presumption in favor of the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction.").
219. Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1557-60.
220. Id. at 1558 ("[D]eclining jurisdiction outside of subsection (c)()-(3)
should be the exception, rather than the rule.").
221. See id.
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Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit Courts of
222Appeals have also looked at legislative history for support. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals looked at the circumstances
surrounding the enactment of section 1367 and found that while one
purpose of drafting section 1367 was to resurrect pendent-party
jurisdiction after the Supreme Court rejected it in Finley, another
purpose was to provide a firm statutory basis for supplemental
jurisdiction generally. 223 However, the court rejected the contention
that the statute was meant to simply codify, rather than alter, the
judge-made principles of pendent jurisdiction.224 The court found
that the interpretation that "section 1364(c)(4) more carefully
channels courts' discretion... comports with the text and structure
of the statute... but also is entirely consistent with the legislative
history. 225
As a result of the fact that these circuits have held that section
1367(c) grants only limited discretion to district courts, a district
court in one of these circuits must articulate why it refuses to
exercise jurisdiction over a claim if the reason is not enumerated in
section 1367(c)(1)-(4); otherwise, it will be questioned or possibly
overturned.226
2. Making Sense of Section 1441(c) and Section 1367(c)
Another issue concerning the court's discretion to dismiss
claims from the federal forum deals solely with cases in which the
court's original jurisdiction is based on federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. section 1331.227 This issue arises partly from
222. Itar-Tass, 140 F.3d at 447-48 (stating that "[t]his interpretation not only
comports with the text and structure of the statute, but is also consistent with
the legislative history," and then explaining congressional discussions and
considerations related to the enactment of § 1367); Executive Software, 24 F.3d
at 1559-60.
223. Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1552-55.
224. Id. at 1559 n.12.
225. Id. at 1558-59.
226. See id. at 1560-61 ("[A]ny further extension of Gibbs through
subsection (c)(4) should be undertaken only when the district court both
articulates 'compelling reasons' for declining jurisdiction and identifies how
the situation that it confronts is 'exceptional.').
227. As such, this Sub-Part only refers to claims where original jurisdiction
is based on section 1331. For a discussion on section 1441(c), see infra Part
V.E.
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confusion over section 1441 (c), relating to the court's discretion with
respect to removal. Section 1441 (c) states:
[w]henever a separate and independent claim or cause of
action within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of
this title is joined with one or more otherwise non-
removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may
be removed and the district court may determine all issues
therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in
228which State law predominates.
This statute seems to be the polar opposite of supplemental
jurisdiction, as section 1441(c) deals with a claim that is "separate
and independent,, 229 while section 1367 deals with a claim that is "so
related., 230 However, the interaction and apparent overlap between
these two statutes has caused both confusion and criticism. 231 The
main question at issue is whether section 1441(c) suggests or allows
the district court to dismiss federal law claims once it has dismissed
state law claims under section 1367(c). This Sub-Part attempts to
clarify some of these issues.
The first thing to understand is that section 1367(c) deals with
the discretion of the court when it already has the power to hear a
supplemental claim. Concededly, in a section 1367(c) analysis the
court is deciding whether to retain a claim that it has already
determined is "so related" to the federal claim. Thus, "where the
state claims are pendent, or supplemental, they necessarily arise from
a single wrong and cannot be construed as 'separate and
independent' for the purposes of Section 1441(c)." 232  However,
courts disagree as to whether it is ever appropriate to remand a
federal law claim under section 1367(c).233 While some courts have
228. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000).
229. Id.
230. Id. § 1367(a).
231. See Moore v. DeBiase, 766 F. Supp. 1311, 1319 n.13 (D.N.J. 1991);
Edward Hartnett, A New Trick From an Old and Abused Dog: Section 1441(c)
Lives and Now Permits the Remand of Federal Question Cases, 63 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1099, 1100-01 & nn.7-9 (1995).
232. City of New Rochelle v. Town of Mamaroneck, 111 F. Supp. 2d 353,
372 (2000) (citing Hickerson v. City of New York, 932 F. Supp. 550, 558
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
233. See Bodenner v. Graves, 828 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Mich. 1993);
Administaff, Inc. v. Kaster, 799 F. Supp. 685 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
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argued that the discretionary power to remand federal law claims
under section 1441(c) cannot possibly extend to section 1367(c)
because they necessarily are not separate and independent, other
courts have found that it can.234
While there may not be support from the legislative history or
case law of section 1367(c) for the court to have the discretion to
remand the entire case,235 cases that have found that the court has the
discretion to do so have found support in section 1441(C). 236 In one
such case, Bodenner v. Graves,237 a district court explained that
while it could only find one case in support of complete dismissal
under section 1367, it found support from the fact that other courts
had stated that sections 1367 and 1441(c) were "analogous with
respect to the complete dismissal issue. 238 Therefore, in deciding to
dismiss both state and federal claims under section 1367(c), the court
relied on cases where the courts found that section 1441(c) allows
the court to remand an entire action.
239
This issue is of particular concern to litigants who want to enjoy
the federal forum. If a court follows this idea that section 1441(c)
provides support for the fact that once supplemental claims are
dismissed, the court may use its discretion to remand the entire case,
then all claims may be out the door. However, realize that this issue
brings up an interesting problem with forum shopping. Suppose that
a plaintiff files both federal and state claims in federal court, and that
the court uses its discretion to dismiss the supplemental claims
because they contain a novel issue of state law, or because state law
234. Compare In re City of Mobile, 75 F.3d 605, 607 (1 Ith Cir. 1996)
(stating that there is no support for the assertion that the court can exercise the
discretion to remand an entire case under § 1367(c)), with Bodenner v. Graves,
828 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (finding that the court could find support
for remanding an entire case through § 1367(c) in cases that address section
1441(c)).
235. See In re City of Mobile, 75 F.3d at 607.
236. See Bodenner, 828 F. Supp. at 518-19.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 519.
239. Id. It is important to note that courts are split as to whether or not §
1441(c) allows a court to dismiss an entire action. See, e.g., City of New
Rochelle v. Town of Marmaroneck, 111 F. Supp. 2d 353, 372-73 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (discussing the differing viewpoints as to whether § 1441(c) grants the
district court the discretion to remand federal claims, or whether it only grants
discretion to remand state claims).
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predominates. The plaintiff may then decide whether she would like
to keep her federal claim in federal court, and litigate her state claims
in state court, or whether she wants to forgo litigating in both forums
and continue to pursue all claims in state court.240 On the other hand,
imagine a scenario where the plaintiff files her federal and state
claims in state court, and the defendant has the claims removed to
federal court. Imagine that the district court then determines that
under section 1367(c) it will dismiss the state claims. Here, the
plaintiff no longer has a choice of whether to forgo litigating in two
forums; rather she is forced to litigate in two separate forums, or to
dismiss one of the claims.24 1 Furthermore, "as a general matter,
plaintiffs and defendants differ in their litigation resources and
therefore in their need for a single forum .... This disparity in
litigation resources between plaintiffs and defendants is especially
dramatic in removed cases. The majority of cases that get removed
are those filed by individuals against corporations. 242 Thus, it could
be argued that "there is good reason to treat direct-filed and removed
cases differently, particularly where state law predominates in the
case as a whole.",243 As a result, where a court determines that it can
use the support of section 1441(c) to remand a whole case under
section 1367(c), this may be better for the plaintiff who would rather
litigate in only one court; however, the defendant who may benefit
from this forced split, would prefer the court to state that it cannot
dismiss the whole claim.
E. Tolling State Statutes of Limitations Under Section 1367(d)
When a plaintiff pursues an action in the federal forum, and the
complaint contains a state law claim that does not have an
independent basis of subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff runs the
risk that the court will dismiss the state law claim.244 If the federal
court dismisses the state claim, the plaintiff may decide to pursue the
240. See Hartnett, supra note 231, at 1171; supra Part IV.E.2.b.
241. Id. at 1172.
242. Id. at 1174-75.
243. Id. at 1171.
244. See supra Part IV.D for a discussion of the court's discretion in
dismissing a state law claim.
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245state claim in state court. What happens, however, if the state
statute of limitations is tolled before the plaintiff has the opportunity
to do so? Should a plaintiff who has filed an action in federal court
in a timely manner be penalized now because the court dismissed her
claim after the statute of limitations has expired? Or, for that matter,
should a plaintiff be able to take advantage of a rule that would allow
her to file in state court after the set statute of limitations has
expired? If she is the one who voluntarily dismisses the claim,
should the state statute of limitations still be tolled? These are just
some of the concerns inherent in the construction of section
1367(d).246
At its root, section 1367(d) serves as a means of insurance for
the plaintiff who files a state law claim in federal court: If the
plaintiff filed the action in federal court in a timely manner, the state
law claim will not be lost simply because the federal court dismisses
the state claim after the state's statute of limitations has expired.
This is a built in protective mechanism, which stops the state clock
from ticking while an action is pending in federal court and for thirty
days thereafter, provided that the state statute of limitations does not
allow for a longer tolling period.247 Therefore, a plaintiff need not
worry that a choice to file her claim in federal court will lead to no
court hearing her claim.
However, there are limitations on section 1367(d), and questions
as to its constitutionality. 248  While case law and commentary
245. See, e.g., Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002)
(The plaintiff re-filed in state court in Minnesota after the federal district court
dismissed plaintiff's state law claims.).
246. Section 1367(d) (2000) states:
The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a),
and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed
at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection
(a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30
days after it is dismissed unless State-law provides for a longer tolling
period.
247. Id.
248. See generally Raygor, 534 U.S. at 548 (holding that § 1367(d) does not
apply to a suit against a non-consenting state defendant that is subsequently
dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, but leaving open whether it
would be constitutional as applied to other defendants); Jinks v. Richland
County, 123 S. Ct. 1667, 1673 (2003) (addressing the question left open by
Raygor and upholding the constitutionality of § 1367(d) as applied to a
municipality).
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regarding this tolling provision is scarce,249 there are a few important
developments regarding this subsection that a plaintiff contemplating
filing a state law claim in federal court should consider. For that
matter, there are also issues a defendant contemplating removal
should consider. This Part discusses the constitutionality of the
tolling provision of section 1367 and inquires into whether section
1367(d) only applies when the court dismisses a state law claim for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or whether section 1367(d) also
applies when the court or the plaintiff dismisses the claim on other
grounds. Finally this Part discusses subsection (d)'s implications on
forum shopping.
1. The constitutionality of section 1367(d)
The question concerning the constitutionality of section 1367(d)
is twofold, though both inquiries relate to whether section 1367(d) is
a violation of the principles of state sovereignty. 250 The first issue
addresses whether Congress has the power to create a law that
regulates state procedure. 251 The second issue addresses whether the
tolling provision can apply to claims brought against a state's
252 253actors or against political subdivisions. The answer appears to
be that Congress has the power to enact this subsection,254 but that
the provision may not apply to non-consenting state defendants after
a federal court has dismissed a state claim on Eleventh Amendment
grounds.
255
a. congressional power to enact section 1367(d)
The first Supreme Court decision that examined the
constitutionality of section 1367(d) was Raygor v. Regents of the
249. While § 1367 has been substantially criticized, subsection (d) has gone
unnoticed for quite some time. See Ruth Vanstory Horger, Comment, For
Whom the Bell Tolls: Tolling State Statutes of Limitations and the
Constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), 54 S.C. L. REv. 1047, 1051, 1057 &
n.85 (2003).
250. See Jinks, 123 S. Ct. at 1667.
251. See id. at 1670-72.
252. See Raygor, 534 U.S. at 539-48.
253. See Jinks, 123 S. Ct. at 1672-73.
254. Id. at 1671-72.
255. Raygor, 534 U.S. at 548.
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256University of Minnesota. However, the Court was not preoccupied
with Congress's power to enact the provision. Rather, the Court
focused on whether the provision applied to a non-consenting state
defendant.257  It was not until its decision in Jinks v. Richland
County258 that the Court explicitly held that Congress had the power
to enact section 1367(d).259
Although the defendant in Jinks argued that the provision was
facially invalid as it exceeded the powers of Congress, the Court
rejected this argument. 260 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme
Court determined that Congress had the power to enact the provision
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.26' Under that clause,
Congress has the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by [the] Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof., 262 The Court found that subsection (d) was a necessary and
proper execution of Congress's Article III power "'to constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme court."' ' 2 6 3 The Court reiterated
that "necessity" does not necessarily mean "absolutely necessary";
rather, it is sufficient that the act be "'[1] conducive to the due
administration of justice' in federal court, and [2] is 'plainly adapted'
to that end.''264 The Court concluded that the tolling provision of
section 1367 met the first requirement, as the provision provides for
a "fair and efficient operation of the federal courts and is therefore
conducive to the administration of justice. ' '265 The Court highlighted
the efficiency promoted by section 1367(d) by looking at the
inefficiency of the pre-section 1367 options that the subsection
replaced. 266 The Court explained that subsection (d) assures "that
256. Id.
257. Id. at 541-47.
258. 123 S. Ct. 1667.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1670.
261. Id. at 1670-72.
262. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
263. Jinks, 123 S. Ct. at 1671 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9).
264. Id. at 1671 (footnote omitted) (quoting McColloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 414-15,417, 421 (1819)).
265. Id..
266. Id. The court explained that before Congress enacted § 1367(d), there
were three options from which a court could choose in anticipation that the
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state-law claims asserted under § 1367(a) will not become time
barred while pending in federal court., 2 6 7 As a result, the subsection
eliminates a barrier to accessing the federal court system for a
plaintiff with an action that contains both federal and state claims
that are so related as to form part of the same case or controversy.
26 8
Therefore, the Court found that section 1367(d) satisfies the second
requirement in that it is "plainly adapted" to Congress's power to
establish the lower federal courts and to provide for fair and efficient
exercise of their Article III powers.
269
After determining that Congress had the power to enact section
1367(d) under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court addressed
whether the provision violated the principles of state sovereignty.
270
The argument was that Congress lacks the power to regulate
procedure in state courts, and that the tolling provision is arguably a
regulation of state court procedure, therefore it is unconstitutional.271
However, the issue is resolved by skilled labeling. The Court
explained in Jinks that the categories of "substance" and "procedure"
do not have firm boundaries nor immutable shapes; rather "the
meaning[s] of 'substance' and 'procedure' ... [are] 'largely
determined by the purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn.'
272
While in some situations the court may label statutes of limitations as
procedure, in other cases it may label them as substance. 73 In the
defendant would assert a statute of limitations defense in state court: (1) the
court could make the dismissal of the state law claim conditional upon the
defendant's waiver of that defense in state court; (2) the court could retain
jurisdiction over the state law claim, even though the federal court was not the
appropriate forum for the claim; or (3) the court could dismiss the plaintiff's
claim for the time being, but allow the plaintiff to re-file the claim in federal
court if the state court dismissed the action due to the defendant's assertion that
the claim was time-barred. Id. (citing Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963-
64 (1st Cir. 1991); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 657 (7th Cir. 1985);
Fin. Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
and Rheaume v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 666 F.2d 925, 932 (5th Cir. 1982)).
267. Id. at 1672.
268. Id. at 1671.
269. Id. at 1672.
270. Id.; see also Prinz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997).
271. Jinks, 123 S. Ct. at 1672.
272. Id. (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988)).
273. Compare Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 726 (holding that statutes of limitation
are procedural for purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause), with Erie R.R.
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context of Jinks, the Court found that statutes of limitations fall
within the category of "substance"; 274 therefore, subsection (d) does
not regulate state procedure and does not violate the principle of state
sovereignty in that regard.275 As such, the tolling provision is a
constitutional exercise of Congressional power.
276
The Supreme Court held that section 1367(d) is a valid exercise
of Congress's powers, both in that it is necessary and proper to its
27power to create lower federal courts,27 and because it is not a
regulation of state court procedure.278 Although this may appear to
be the end of the discussion, there is still an issue as to whether the
statute is constitutional as applied to certain defendants, specifically
those defendants who are arms of the state or a political subdivision.
b. constitutionality of the tolling provision as applied to non-
consenting state defendants
The Supreme Court took its first look into the constitutionality
of section 1367(d) when it examined Raygor.2 79 There, the plaintiffs
asserted both federal law and state law claims in federal district court
against a public university. 28 However, because the defendant was
an arm of the state, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims
on Eleventh Amendment grounds.281  After the district court
dismissed both claims, the plaintiffs filed their state claims in state
court.282 The defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that
the action was time-barred and that section 1367(d) did not apply in
this situation.283 The state court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, agreeing with the defendant, and both claims
were subsequently dismissed.284
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (finding that statutes of limitation are
substantive for purposes of the Erie Doctrine).
274. Jinks, 123 S. Ct. at 1672.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1671-72.
278. Id. at 1672.
279. Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002).
280. Id. at 537.
281. Id. at 536-38.
282. Id. at 538.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed that
subsection (d) could not toll the state statute of limitations in that
situation because the tolling provision did not apply where the
defendant was a non-consenting state or state actor.2 1 While the
Court in Raygor held that the provision did not apply to non-
consenting state defendants, the Court based its decision on the idea
that subsection (d) itself was not a clear expression of Congressional
intent to change the balance of federal and state power.
2 86
The Court noted that if it were to read the statute as applicable to
non-consenting state defendants there would be "serious doubts" as
to the constitutionality of section 1367(d).287 However, the Court did
not confront this constitutional issue head on.288 Instead, the Court
looked at the fact that control over state statutes of limitations is
typically a role reserved for a state's government. 289 As such, when
Congress acts to toll a state's statute of limitations, Congress shifts
the balance between federal and state power. 29 The Court explained
that if Congress intends to shift this balance of power, it must make
this intent "'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."'
291
The Court concluded that Congress was unclear as to its intent to
include state law claims dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment in
the tolling provision.292 Additionally, the Court refused to read
anything into the subsection that was not clearly already written
therein.
293
Although the Court refused to focus its discussion on whether a
federal toll on a state statute constituted an abrogation of state
sovereign immunity with respect to claims brought against state
defendants, the Court's discussion appears broad enough to
encompass this likelihood as well.294  While the Eleventh
Amendment ensures state sovereign immunity from suit, Congress
285. Id. at 548.
286. See id. at 544-47.
287. Id. at 542.
288. Id. at 544.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 543 (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65
(1989)).
292. Id. at 545-46.
293. Id. at 546.
294. See id. at 543-47.
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may abrogate this immunity through certain powers.295 The plaintiffs
argued that the tolling provision applied to their claims as Congress
enacted it to prevent a due process violation, and that therefore
Congress enacted the subsection under its section 5 powers under the
296Fourteenth Amendment. The Court found this argument
unpersuasive and irrelevant because the statute was still unclear as to
297Congressional intent. In order for Congress to abrogate such
immunity, Congress must make its intent clear in the words of the
298statute. This was the downfall for the plaintiffs in Raygor, for the
Court concluded that subsection (d) did not state a clear intention to
toll the limitations period for claims against non-consenting states
after a state claim is dismissed based on Eleventh Amendment
grounds.299
Thus, the Court decided that even though Congress might be
able to use its section 5 power to abrogate state immunity in this
situation, there was no clear showing that it had.3 °° Congress had not
295. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; Raygor, 534 U.S. at 547. For a discussion on
Congressional power to abrogate sovereign immunity, see Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment
barred congressional authorization of suits against non-consenting states, but
the Court explained that two provisions provide Congress with the power to
abrogate sovereign immunity from suit; one of those provisions is section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
296. See Raygor, 534 U.S. at 546.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 543-46.
300. However, the Court did note that Congress could abrogate state
immunity if Congress makes its intent "unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute" through its section 5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 543. Yet the Court generally seems reluctant to allow Congress to exercise
this section 5 power, even though it has held elsewhere that section 5 may
allow for congressional power to abrogate immunity in certain situations. The
Court may be reluctant to find such power if it finds that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not justify the enactment. See generally Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (finding that section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not authorize congressional abrogation of state immunity
through the ADEA, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
age, since "states may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the
Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest"). For other cases that reject the claim that abrogation
of state sovereign immunity to suit is justified by section 5, see Coll. Sav. Bank
v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) and
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
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provided for a clear intent to shift the balance between state and
federal power.30 1 Therefore, the Court held that section 1367(d) did
not apply to non-consenting state defendants.30 2
The crux of the decision centered on whether or not the State
consented.30 3 Although the plaintiffs argued that the defendant
consented to suit by waiting almost ten months to dismiss the suit on
Eleventh Amendment grounds, the Court in Raygor disagreed,
finding that the defendant did not consent to suit.304 Rather, the Court
viewed the defendant's timing in filing the motion consistent with
the pre-trial schedule. 30 5 The Court found that the defendant acted
reasonably by raising its Eleventh Amendment defense in its
answer. 3 6 In short, the Court felt that the defendant moved to
dismiss the case in a timely and efficient manner.3°7 As the Court
found that the defendant was a non-consenting state, the tolling
provision did not apply to the state statute of limitations.
Furthermore, the Court explained that a limitations period may
be viewed as "'a central condition' to a sovereign's waiver of
immunity to suit.30 8 The Court explained that when a plaintiff files a
suit against the United States, there is a rebuttable presumption that
equitable tolling under federal law applies to waivers of the United
States' immunity; however, the Court has never held that when a
plaintiff files suit against a state actor, the same rebuttable
627 (1999). For further discussion on issues that arise when the defendant is a
non-consenting state, see infra Part IV.E.2.a.
.301. Raygor, 534 U.S. at 544.
302. Id. at 548.
303. See id. at 546-47.
304. See id.
305. Id. at 547. Plaintiffs filed suit in the district court on or about August
29, 1996. In September 1996 the defendant filed answers to the complaints
and asserted the Eleventh Amendment as one of its eight affirmative defenses.
The court set a pre-trial schedule, according to which discovery would end by
late May 1997, and dispositive motions would be filed by mid-July 1997. In
early July 1997, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the fact that
the claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss on July 11, 1997. Id. at 537-38.
306. Id. at 547.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 542-43 (quoting United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 843
(1986).
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presumption applies. 30 9 The Court held that a state may provide for
conditions upon consenting to suit in its own courts.310 By providing
a statute of limitations for certain claims, a state consents to suit
upon the condition that a plaintiff files that suit within the limited
time period. Once the period lapses, the plaintiff can no longer meet
the condition and the state's invitation to suit is withdrawn.
c. constitutionality of section 1367(d) as applied to consenting state
defendants
A different issue arises if a court finds that the state has
consented.31 1 This has important implications for a state or state
actor who attempts to remove a case from state court to federal court,
from which a state claim is later dismissed.3 12  The Court has
commented that there are limited situations where a state would be
viewed as consenting to suit.313 The Court has given examples of
two situations where a state might be viewed as having consented to
suit: [1] "when a State voluntarily invoked federal court
jurisdiction," or [2] "otherwise 'ma[de] a "clear declaration" that it
intends to submit itself to our jurisdiction.' 314 This is an important
notion for a state defendant, who should realize that removing a case
from state court to federal court is an act of consent,315 as removal is
a voluntary invocation of federal court jurisdiction.
309. Id. at 543 (citing Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95
(1990)). Although Justice Stevens agreed in his dissent with the majority
opinion that § 1367(d) could not apply to a non-consenting state, Justice
Stevens stated that Minnesota had given its consent by agreeing to be treated as
a private employer and by allowing plaintiffs to sue the state for a period of
forty-five days. Id. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained
that tolling the period of limitations is very different from Congress's power to
entirely abrogate a state's sovereign immunity defense. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
310. Id. at 543.
311. Id. at 547.
312. Id. at 533, 547.
313. Id. at 547.
314. Id. (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999)).
315. See Oleski v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 822 A.2d 120, 126-27 & n.5 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2003) (holding that a state actor who removed the case against it
to federal court consented by virtue of the act of removing the case).
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d. the constitutionality of section 1367(d) as applied to political
subdivisions and other non-state defendants
In Raygor, the Court reserved the question as to the
constitutionality of section 1367(d) as applied to non-state
defendants.316 However, recently, in Jinks 17 the Supreme Court
determined, in a unanimous decision, the constitutionality of section
1367(d) as applied to political subdivisions. There, plaintiff Susan
Jinks asserted an action against Richland County in the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina.31 8 Jinks asserted
both a federal claim and two state claims, and she asserted all claims
in a timely manner.319 In November 1997, the district court granted
summary judgment on the federal claim in favor of the defendant.32 °
Subsequently, the district court dismissed the state law claims
without prejudice.32' Thereafter, the plaintiff filed her state law
claims in state court, and judgment was granted in her favor.322 The
defendant then appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court,
claiming that the state law claims were time-barred because section
1367(d) was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant, a state
political subdivision.323 The state supreme court reversed on the
grounds that the provision "interfere[d] with the State's sovereign
authority to establish the extent to which its political subdivisions are
subject to suit. ' 324  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed.325
After the Court found that Congress had the authority to enact
section 1367(d),326  the Court examined whether, though
constitutional, section 1367(d) applies to state political
subdivisions. 327 The Court found that it did.328 The Court explained
316. 534 U.S. at 547.
317. 123 S. Ct. 1667.
318. Id. at 1670.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Jinks v. Richard County, 563 S.E.2d. 104, 107 (S.C. 2002), rev;d, Jinks
v. Richard County, 123 S.Ct. 1667 (2003).
325. Jinks, 123 S. Ct. at 1673.
326. Id. at 1670-72.
327. Id. at 1672-73.
328. Id.
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that a municipality does not enjoy the same constitutionally protected
immunity from suit as a state does. 329  Therefore, the principle
determined in Raygor330 did not extend to municipalities or other
non-state defendants; section 1367(d) is constitutional and applies to
all non-state defendants.
3 3 1
2. The claims affected by section 1367(d)
The plain language of section 1367(d) states in pertinent part
that the statute applies to "any claim asserted under subsection (a),
and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily
dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim
under subsection (a)."332 While case law is scarce as to whether or
not this includes claims that the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses, or
whether this includes claims that are dismissed for reasons other than
lack of subject matter jurisdiction,333 this Part discusses the
prevailing views.
One thing is clear: the statute clearly provides that section
1367(d) applies when a federal court dismisses a claim asserted
under section 1367(a) for lack of supplemental jurisdiction for any
reason under section 1367(a)-(c).334 However, it is less clear
whether subsection (d) applies to claims dismissed for reasons other
than lack of supplemental jurisdiction, or to claims voluntarily
dismissed by the plaintiff. Clearly, a valid argument could be made
that subsection (d) applies without regard to the federal court's
reason for dismissal, unless of course the court dismisses the case on
the merits.
335
329. Id.
330. Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002).
331. Jinks, 123 S. Ct. at 1673.
332. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2000).
333. See Blinn v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 781 So. 2d 1103, 1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2002) (stating that the court could not find a published opinion that
discussed the issue of whether the tolling provision was triggered by a plaintiff
voluntarily dismissing a state claim with the intention of re-filing in state
court).
334. See Murphy, supra note 3, at 1032.
335. Id. at 1033-35; see Raygor, 534 U.S. at 545.
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a. claims dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds
However, there are situations that may limit the scope of section
1367(d). A primary situation is when a plaintiff files a suit in federal
court and asserts a state law claim against a non-consenting state
defendant that is later dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
336
The Supreme Court touched on this issue in its decision in Raygor.
337
In Raygor, the Court said that on its face the tolling provision
appears to broadly apply "to any claim technically 'asserted' under
subsection (a) as long as it [is] later dismissed, regardless of the
reason for dismissal. 338 However, the Court determined that there
would be serious issues if this provision were to apply to non-
consenting state defendants after a supplemental claim was dismissed
based on Eleventh Amendment grounds.339
The Court first explained that "the Eleventh Amendment bars
the adjudication of pendent state law claims against nonconsenting
state defendants in federal court."340  Therefore, although section
1367(a) is broad, it cannot cover claims against non-consenting states
because the Eleventh Amendment is an "'explicit limitation on
federal jurisdiction.' 34' As such, a non-consenting state cannot be
forced to adjudicate in federal or state court.342 Even though the
Court clearly stated that a federal court cannot retain jurisdiction
under subsection (a) over a state law claim that violates the
principles of state sovereign immunity, there was still a question as
to whether subsection (d) applied against a non-consenting state
defendant, where the state law claim was first asserted under
subsection (a) and later dismissed on Eleventh Amendment
grounds.
343
The Court explained how one could read subsection (d) broadly
as applying to any claim asserted under subsection (a) regardless of
336. See Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002).
337. Id. at 544-47.
338. Id. at 542.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 540-41 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 120 (1984)).
341. Id. at 541 (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 118).
342. Id. at 543.
343. Id. at 542.
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the reason for dismissal.344 However, the Court stated that if it were
to read the tolling provision as having that broad effect, there would
be "serious doubts" as to its constitutionality.
345
The Court went on to explain that to read the provision's
application as inclusive of all claims asserted under subsection (a)
and later dismissed for any reason at all would be to read the
subsection in isolation of "a statute that specifically contemplates
only a few grounds for dismissal. 346 Yet the Court concluded that it
was unclear whether or not the statute included grounds for dismissal
beyond subject matter jurisdiction. 347 The Court further explained
that it did not matter for the purpose of its decision in Raygor what
subsection (d) excluded; rather, what was of importance was whether
there was a clear statement of what the subsection included.348
Notwithstanding the Court's discussion, its conclusion clearly stated
that subsection (d) does not apply to claims filed in federal court
against non-consenting State defendants that are subsequently
dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds. 34 9 Thus, while the Court
would not explicitly conclude that the subsection does not apply to
claims dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the effect of the
Raygor decision is the same as if it had done so.
b. claims voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff
The next question deals with the scope of the language "any
other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed. 3 50 The
suggestion is that if a claim is dismissed, a party may decide to
voluntarily dismiss all other claims asserted and pursue them in one
action in state court.35 1 However, what if a plaintiff simply
voluntarily dismisses a state law claim in anticipation of the fact that
the court is about to do so on its own?
344. Id. For a more detailed discussion of what types of dismissals are
included in subsection (d), see infra Part IV.E.2.b.
345. Raygor, 534 U.S. at 542.
346. Id. at 545.
347. Id.
348. Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991)).
349. Id. at 548.
350. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2000); see Murphy, supra note 3, at 1032-35.
351. See Murphy, supra note 3, at 1033.
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Although few courts have dealt with this issue, in Blinn v.
Florida Department of Transportation 35 a Florida court looked at
whether the statute would apply if the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed
the claim.353 The court held that it did.354 This finding has enormous
implications on the forum shopping market.
In Blinn, a plaintiff filed state and federal claims in federal
district court. Two years later, while under the impression that the
court would dismiss her claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds,
she voluntarily dismissed the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4; nine days later she filed her complaint in state court.
355
The defendants argued that the statute of limitations period had run
out.356 The state district court found that it indeed had as section
1367(d) only applied to claims dismissed by the federal court in
which the federal court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.357 The district court found that the plain language of the
statute was ambiguous, and came to its conclusion by looking at the
legislative history of section 1367(d).358 The state court of appeals
reversed, looking at the plain meaning of the statute and concluding
that section 1367(d) applied to claims dismissed for reasons other
than those found in subsection (C).359  While the state court of
appeals admitted that the legislative history of subsection (d) pointed
to the conclusion that the tolling period only applied to cases
dismissed by the federal court pursuant to section 1367(a)-(c),36 ° the
court explained that its state follows the policy that "where the
language of a statute is clear, the language must be given effect,
rather than the purpose or intent indicated by legislative history."
361
However, as the discussion in the Blinn opinion dictates,
different courts may find different answers to whether or not
subsection (d) is limited in its application to claims dismissed by a
352. 781 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
353. Id. at 1104.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 1107.
361. Id. (citing Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n v. Fla.
Div. of Admin. Hearings, 686 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 1997)).
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federal court pursuant to section 1367(a)-(c).362 A court that
determines that the language of section 1367(d) is unambiguous and
does not look at legislative intent, may find as the court in Blinn did;
however, a court that finds that the language is ambiguous may
examine legislative intent and reach the opposite result.
If a court decides to examine legislative history and intent, it
will likely find that section 1367(d) applies solely to claims
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.363 In fact, the
tolling provision appears to exist to ensure that if the court decides to
use its discretion to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction over
a claim, the plaintiff can still pursue the claim elsewhere.
364
Therefore, it would make sense that Congress intended to limit the
tolling provision to claims dismissed under section 1367(a)-(c).
However, in a situation where the plaintiff is the one voluntarily
dismissing the claim, the policy concern driving subsection (d) no
longer applies, as the plaintiff is not in the vulnerable position of
being at the mercy of the court's discretion. On the other hand, this
limitation is not express in the statute, which leads one to question
whether or not Congress intended this restriction. While the tolling
provision does not state on its face that it is only applicable where
the federal courts decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of a
claim under section 1367(a) for reasons stated in section 1367(c),
this is the view generally adopted by commentators.
365
3. The effect of section 1367(d) on forum selection
Subsection (d) has important implications for forum selection.
As a result, there are important factors that each party should
consider when selecting its forum. The Court in Jinks explained that
prior to subsection (d), a plaintiff with an action that contained both a
federal and state law claim that formed part of the same case or
controversy had three options: (1) she could file a single federal
court action and run the risk that the district court would dismiss her
state law claim after it would be too late for her to re-file in state
court; (2) the plaintiff could file the entire action in state court,
giving up on her right to the federal forum; or (3) the plaintiff could
362. Id. at 1105-10.
363. Id.
364. See Jinks v. Richard County, 123 S. Ct. 1667, 1671-72 (2003
365. See Murphy, supra note 3.
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file the state law claim in state court and the federal claim in federal
court, and request that the state action be stayed pending the results
of the federal claim.366 The Court explains that the tolling provision
allows the plaintiff to file a state law claim in federal court without
having to worry that her state law claim will later be time-barred.367
This factor should provide comfort to the plaintiff seeking to file in
federal court. If her claim is later dismissed by the federal court, she
can then re-file her claim in state court. However, there are some
important considerations that both plaintiffs and defendants should
note before making any choices.
a. implications on forum shopping and the constitutionality of
section 1367(d)
In Jinks, the Court found that subsection (d) is constitutional as
applied to political subdivisions and non-state defendants.
368
Therefore, post-Jinks, a plaintiff who decides to file a supplemental
claim in federal court against a non-state defendant can feel more
secure that her claim will not be lost if the court decides to dismiss it.
Stated more accurately, a plaintiff no longer has to worry whether the
subsection will apply if her state claim is later dismissed for lack of
supplemental jurisdiction.
However, if a plaintiff is filing a suit against a state actor in
federal court, she must be careful as her claim may expire while
pending, and she may not be able to seek recourse in subsection
(d).369 If the court dismisses her supplemental claim on Eleventh
Amendment grounds, she is without recourse.370 However, if she
can show that the defendant consented to suit, she will be able to
assert her claim in state court and the tolling provision will apply.
371
Therefore, it is important for a state actor defendant who is sued in
state court to think twice before removing the case to federal court,
as this action may be interpreted as consenting to suit.
372
366. Jinks, 123 S. Ct. at 1671-72.
367. Id. at 1672.
368. Id.
369. See Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002).
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Oleski v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 822 A.2d 120, 126-27 & n.5 (Pa.
Commnw. Ct. 2003).
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b. the implications of the scope of section 1367(d) on forum selection
In determining whether to bring an action in the federal forum,
the plaintiff should consider what may happen to her claim if it is
dismissed from the federal court for a reason other than lack of
jurisdiction. However, the plaintiff should also consider her choices
such as voluntarily dismissing her suit and re-filing in state court. If
a court reads the provision as applying to the voluntary dismissals,
this may afford a plaintiff ammunition as she may voluntarily
dismiss the state law claim in fear of losing it; this might be
especially helpful if the defendant is the one to remove the case as
she may dismiss a part of her claim that she knows would have an
unfavorable result in federal court, but a favorable one in state court.
However, few courts have decided this issue, so the only plaintiff
who might be secure with this gamble is the plaintiff in Florida,
where Blinn was decided.
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